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district’s required science curriculum by suggesting to students 
alternative viewpoints inconsistent with that curriculum.1  This case, 
LeVake v. Independent School District,2 should be of great interest to 
legal theorists.  Its holding, and the reasoning on which it is based, may 
serve as a Socratic provocation regarding the extent to which public 
school teachers have constitutional academic freedom (apart from 
statutory requirements or permission) to voluntarily include criticisms of 
and alternatives to evolutionary theory. 
II.  LEVAKE’S STORY 
Rodney LeVake was hired as a math and science teacher by his school 
district in 1984.  During the summer of 1997, LeVake was offered an 
opportunity to teach tenth grade biology in the forthcoming school year.  
Prior to teaching the class, he conferred with both the principal and the 
co-chair of the science department about the required curriculum as well 
as the course itself.  According to the requirements, “upon completion of 
the class, students will be able to understand that evolution involves 
natural selection and mutations, which constantly cause changes in 
living things.”3  The required text included three chapters on evolution, 
only one of which the teacher was obligated to cover.  These chapters 
contained no criticisms of evolution, nor did they offer any alternative 
theories.  Knowing the curriculum and what was expected of him, 
LeVake agreed to teach the course.4 
When he taught the course in Spring 1998, LeVake dedicated only one 
day, including a lab, to the topic of evolution.  Although the other 
biology teachers also did not spend a lot of time covering the topic 
because of a shortened school year, the co-chair of the science 
department told the principal and LeVake that he was concerned that 
LeVake’s teaching of evolution had been inadequate.  The court wrote 
that LeVake “essentially told [the co-chair] that he could not teach 
evolution according to the prescribed curriculum.”5  At an April 1, 1998 
meeting with the science department co-chair, principal, and curriculum 
director, “LeVake indicated that he did not regard evolution as a viable 
scientific concept.”6  LeVake was asked by the curriculum director 
whether he “mentioned God or the Bible in class because she wanted to 
 
 1. See LeVake v. Indep. Sch. Dist., 625 N.W.2d 502 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001), 
review denied, No. C8-00-1613, 2001 Minn. LEXIS 434, at *1 (Minn. July 24, 2001), 
and cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 814 (2002). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. at 505. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
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be sure that [he] was not discussing religion in a manner that would give 
the impression that the school was not religiously neutral.”7  At an April 
7, 1998 department meeting, organized to discuss LeVake’s teaching of 
the curriculum, LeVake was asked by his principal to compose an essay 
on how he planned in the future to instruct his biology students on the 
topic of evolution.  LeVake complied and submitted an essay explaining 
his position that there is no evidence for evolution and that the theory is 
impossible biologically, anatomically, and physiologically.8  LeVake 
maintained that “the complexity of life that we see around us is a 
testimony that evolution, as it is currently being handled in our text, is 
impossible.”9  He went on to say: 
I don’t believe an unquestioning faith in the theory of evolution is foundational 
to the goals I have stated in teaching my students about themselves, their 
responsibilities, and gaining a sense of awe for what they see around them.  I 
will teach, should the department decide that it is appropriate, the theory of 
evolution.  I will also accompany that treatment of evolution with an honest 
look at the difficulties and inconsistencies of the theory without turning my 
class into a religious one.10 
After conferring with the school district’s attorneys, the curriculum 
director, and others, the principal made a decision to remove LeVake 
from teaching tenth grade biology and to appoint him to teach a ninth 
grade natural science course instead.  The following day LeVake was 
told of his reassignment.  The principal based his decision on his 
“concern that a basic concept of biology, meaning the theory of 
evolution, would be diluted and that students would ‘lose the gist’ of the 
theory.”11  LeVake appealed this decision to the superintendent, who 
subsequently rejected LeVake’s appeal because he “believed that 
LeVake differed fundamentally with the ‘commonly held principles of 
the curriculum outlined,’” and that “LeVake’s insistence on teaching the 
inconsistencies of evolution was not an appropriate method for teaching 
the approved curriculum.”12  On May 24, 1999, LeVake filed a lawsuit 
against the school district, its superintendent, LeVake’s principal, the 
science department co-chair, and the curriculum director.13  LeVake 
 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at 505–06. 
 9. Id. at 506 (internal quotes omitted). 
 10. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
FINALBECKWITH.DOC 2/3/2020  2:49 PM 
 
1314 
claimed that the “respondents violated his right to free exercise of 
religion, free speech, due process, freedom of conscience, and academic 
freedom.”14  The district court granted the respondents’ motion for 
summary judgment.  LeVake appealed that ruling to the Minnesota 
Court of Appeals and the appeals court affirmed the district court 
ruling.15 
III.  THE COURT OF APPEALS’ OPINION 
The court of appeals divided its analysis into the following three parts: 
freedom of religion, free speech, and due process.16  In order for LeVake 
to have prevailed on appeal he would have had to raise a genuine issue 
of material fact concerning at least one of the fundamental rights that he 
claimed the defendants violated. 
A.  Due Process and Free Exercise Claims 
Of the three, LeVake’s due process claim was the weakest because 
LeVake was provided with “sufficient notice about what he could and 
could not teach through the established curriculum and the syllabus,” 
and his contract “required him to ‘faithfully perform the teaching . . . 
prescribed by the School Board.’”17  In his deposition LeVake essentially 
confessed that he told the science department co-chair “that [he could 
not] teach evolution.”18  In addition, LeVake’s argument relied on 
teacher termination cases, but “he was not even demoted.”19 
However, suppose LeVake had been told in advance that the 
curriculum required that he publicly deny his Christian faith while 
affirming a belief in atheism, or face reassignment or possibly demotion, 
but only after a hearing.  Even if LeVake had agreed to these terms, the 
fact that he was given advance notice and afforded a hearing does not 
speak to the substance of the terms to which he agreed.  Consequently, 
even though the court was correct that LeVake’s claim of procedural 
malfeasance had little merit, it does not follow that the school did not 
violate his substantive rights.  The court assessed these alleged violations 
under two general categories: freedom of religion and freedom of speech. 
The court rejected LeVake’s freedom of religion claim on the grounds 
that “[he] does not contend that the respondents prohibited him from 
 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 509 (emphasis omitted) (quoting LeVake’s contract with the school 
district). 
 18. Id. (alteration in original). 
 19. Id. 
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practicing the religion of his choice” or that they “demanded that he 
refrain from practicing his religion outside of the scope of his duties as a 
public school teacher in order to retain his teaching position, and he does 
not assert that the curriculum requirements incidentally infringed on his 
religious practice.”20  However, LeVake did not seem to be arguing that 
the school interfered with his religious practice, but rather, that he was 
reassigned because of his religious beliefs.  The court conceded as much 
when it pointed out that LeVake had used “employment discrimination 
cases to argue that circumstantial evidence of discrimination based on 
his religious belief exists.”21  Aside from the question of whether it was 
appropriate to analogize from employment discrimination cases when 
LeVake had not brought an employment discrimination action, the court 
maintained that LeVake had “not provided authority demonstrating how 
the use of this standard raises a genuine issue of material fact regarding 
his free exercise claim.”22  This last statement is particularly odd since 
the court, under its free speech analysis, seemed to implicitly concede 
that LeVake had raised a genuine issue of material fact concerning free 
exercise and that LeVake was in fact reassigned because of his belief, 
when it wrote that the school’s “concern about [LeVake’s] inability to 
teach the prescribed curriculum was well-founded” because it was 
“[b]ased on LeVake’s belief that evolution is not a viable theory.”23 
The court’s free exercise analysis was terribly confusing.  The court of 
appeals seemed to use the terms “belief” and “practice” interchangeably 
even though the Supreme Court has recognized a clear distinction between 
the two.  State action that discriminates against someone because of his 
or her religious belief is de facto unconstitutional,24 whereas a state 
action that discriminates against a citizen because of his or her religious 
 
 20. Id. at 507 (citation omitted). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 509 (emphasis added). 
 24. In McDaniel v. Paty, the Supreme Court referred to the “Free Exercise 
Clause’s absolute prohibition of infringements on the ‘freedom to believe.’”  435 U.S. 
618, 627 (1978).  The Court asserted in Everson v. Board of Education: “No person can 
be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church 
attendance or non-attendance.”  330 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1947).  According to Eugene 
Volokh, “The government generally may not prosecute someone or otherwise burden 
them . . . for their religious beliefs.”  EUGENE VOLOKH, THE FIRST AMENDMENT: 
PROBLEMS, CASES AND POLICY ARGUMENTS 670 (2001) (citing McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 
627).  See also Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940); Torcaso v. Watkins, 
367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961). 
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practice is prima facie constitutional if it is the result of a generally 
applicable law.25  Thus, because the court conceded that LeVake’s 
reassignment was based on his beliefs, an act that is de facto 
unconstitutional, the court should have ruled in his favor on those 
grounds.26 
B.  The Free Speech Claim and the Nature of Academic Freedom 
The court rejected LeVake’s free speech claim as well.  It relied on 
cases that focus on “a public employee’s free speech rights,”27 including 
two cases that involved conflicts between a teacher’s freedom of 
expression and his employer: Clark v. Holmes28 and Webster v. New 
Lenox School District.29  Because these cases were intermingled by the 
court in its analysis, it is necessary to first make a few comments about 
Webster and Holmes and then discuss the general question of the extent 
to which a particular set of public employees, school teachers, possess 
freedom of speech in their primary workplace, the classroom, and how it 
applies to the concern of this Essay. 
In 1990, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed a district 
court decision to dismiss the complaint of a public school teacher, Ray 
Webster.30  The Seventh Circuit ruled that Webster, who taught junior 
high, had not had his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights violated 
when the superintendent, writing on behalf of the school board, 
instructed Webster by letter that “he should restrict his classroom 
instruction to the curriculum and refrain from advocating a particular 
religious viewpoint.”31  He was “specifically instructed not to teach 
creation science, because the teaching of this theory had been held by the 
federal courts to be religious advocacy.”32  The reason for disciplinary 
 
 25. See, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U. S. 872, 879 (1990). 
 26. Someone may reply that LeVake’s belief in evolution’s falsity is not religious 
but merely secular, and thus is not protected under the First Amendment’s Free Exercise 
Clause.  After all, LeVake admitted that he would critique evolution in the classroom in 
an entirely nonsectarian manner.  Nevertheless, the Court has ruled that freedom of 
religious belief is grounded in a more general liberty of belief: “If there is any fixed star 
in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what 
shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force 
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”  West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. 
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). 
 27. LeVake, 625 N.W.2d at 508. 
 28. Clark v. Holmes, 474 F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1972). 
 29. Webster v. New Lenox Sch. Dist., 917 F.2d 1004 (7th Cir. 1990). 
 30. Id. at 1008. 
 31. Id. at 1005. 
 32. Id. at 1006 (citing Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 592 (1987) (holding 
that creation science “embodies the religious belief that a supernatural creator was 
responsible for the creation of humankind”)). 
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action arose when Webster included in his lesson plans “nonevolutionary 
theories of creation to rebut a statement in the social studies textbook 
indicating that the world is over four billion years old.”33  Webster defended 
himself against the charge of having violated the Establishment Clause 
by arguing that “at most, he encouraged students to explore alternative 
viewpoints.”34 
The court’s holding in Webster dealt with the narrow question of 
whether Webster had “a first amendment right to determine the curriculum 
content of his junior high school class.”35  Given the controversial 
content of Webster’s extracurricular lessons—creation science has been 
repudiated as inherently religious by a number of other courts including 
the U.S. Supreme Court36—and the school board’s responsibility in 
shaping curriculum and avoiding Establishment Clause violations in its 
institutions, Webster’s First and Fourteenth Amendment rights were not 
violated.  That is, the court held that a school may censor classroom 
instruction that seeks to promote or advance a particular religious belief 
such as creation science.37  On the other hand, the court admitted that 
“this case does not present the issue of whether, or under what 
circumstances, a school board may completely eliminate material from 
the curriculum,”38 but rather, what was dispositive in the case was “the 
principle that an individual teacher has no right to ignore the directives 
of duly appointed education authorities.”39  Given that LeVake did not 
teach, and was not trying to teach, creation science, Webster is not quite 
on point. 
The Clark case concerned a temporary full-time faculty member at 
Northern Illinois University (NIU).40  L. Verdelle Clark was offered a 
two year appointment in 1962 by the department of biological sciences, 
but he was warned in the department’s offer letter that: 
[H]is acceptance . . . should be made with the understanding that he should 
remedy certain deficiencies in his professional conduct: he counselled an 
excessive number of students instead of referring them to NIU’s professional 
counsellors; he overemphasized sex in his health survey course; he counselled 
 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 1007. 
 36. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 594 (1987).  The courts have 
employed the terms “creation science” and “creationism” interchangeably. 
 37. Webster, 917 F.2d at 1008. 
 38. Id. (citation omitted). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Clark v. Holmes, 474 F.2d 928, 929–30 (7th Cir. 1972). 
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students with his office door closed; and he belittled other staff members in 
discussions with students.41 
Germane to our analysis of LeVake is Clark’s claim that his academic 
freedom—as a species of freedom of speech—was violated by the 
university when it did not offer him another contract because, in its 
judgment, he did not remedy the professional deficiencies he agreed to 
remedy when he accepted the offer of appointment.  The court rejected 
Clark’s claim on the grounds that “academic freedom” is not “a license 
for uncontrolled expression at variance with established curricular 
contents and internally destructive of the proper functioning of the 
institution.  First Amendment rights must be applied in light of the 
special characteristics of the environment in the particular case.”42  The 
court relied on a balancing test extracted from Pickering v. Board of 
Education,43 a case to which both the plaintiff and defendants appealed 
in Clark44 and which the LeVake court cited in its analysis of the free 
speech rights of public employees.45 
 [I]t cannot be gainsaid that the State has interests as an employer in 
regulating the speech of its employees that differ significantly from those it 
possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general. 
The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the 
teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the 
interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public 
services it performs through its employees.46 
Consequently, the question for the court in LeVake was whether the 
school’s reassignment of LeVake violated his freedom of speech given 
(1) his prior performance of not teaching the curriculum adequately, (2) 
his claim not to believe in evolution, (3) his early assertion that he could 
not teach the curriculum, and (4) his promise in his essay that he would 
teach evolution in the future along with nonreligious criticisms of the 
theory.  Given the totality of these facts (but excluding the second point 
because it may be a religious belief and thus cannot be the basis for state 
 
 41. Id. at 930. 
 42. Id. at 931 (citation omitted). 
 43. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
 44. The court wrote: 
Both parties claim to find support in Pickering v. Board of Education . . . a 
major pronouncement of the First Amendment rights of public school teachers.  
There, the Supreme Court reversed the dismissal of a teacher who had written 
a letter to a local newspaper in which he, as a citizen, criticized the Board of 
Education’s allocation of school funds and its method of informing the 
district’s taxpayers about the need for additional tax revenue. 
Clark, 474 F.2d at 930 (citation omitted). 
 45. LeVake, 625 N.W.2d at 508. 
 46. Clark, 474 F.2d at 931 (alteration in original) (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 
568). 
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action), it appears that Mr. LeVake was reassigned because his superiors 
were not confident that he would teach the course as required in the 
curriculum.  In light of the deference accorded states in matters of public 
education, and given the school district’s legal duty to teach the 
curriculum correctly, the court seemed to have balanced the interests of 
LeVake and the school district appropriately. 
However, under a different set of facts, LeVake might have had a 
strong academic freedom claim.  Suppose LeVake had accepted the offer 
to teach the biology class, agreed to teach the curriculum in precisely the 
way he was told to do so, and subsequently taught everything required in 
the curriculum.  Now suppose that he also offered nonreligious criticisms of 
evolution that were neither in the textbook nor in the required 
curriculum but had been developed and defended by qualified and 
credentialed scholars in respected venues.47  Imagine that the arguments 
offered by these scholars propose conclusions whose premises do not 
contain the Book of Genesis and its tenets as explicit or implicit 
propositions.  These premises and their propositions, unlike those of 
creationism,48 are not derived from, nor are they grounded in, any 
 
 47. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. BEHE, DARWIN’S BLACK BOX: THE BIOCHEMICAL 
CHALLENGE TO EVOLUTION (1996) (Behe earned a Ph.D. in biochemistry from University 
of Pennsylvania and is currently a Professor of Biological Sciences at Lehigh University 
in Pennsylvania); WILLIAM A. DEMBSKI, NO FREE LUNCH: WHY SPECIFIED COMPLEXITY 
CANNOT BE PURCHASED WITHOUT INTELLIGENCE (2002) (Dembski earned Ph.D.’s in 
philosophy and mathematics from University of Illinois and University of Chicago 
respectively and is currently an Associate Research Professor in the Conceptual 
Foundations of Science at Baylor University); WILLIAM A. DEMBSKI, THE DESIGN 
INFERENCE: ELIMINATING CHANCE THROUGH SMALL PROBABILITIES (1998); Robert Kaita, 
Design in Physics & Biology: Cosmological Principle & Cosmic Imperative?, in MERE 
CREATION: SCIENCE, FAITH & INTELLIGENT DESIGN 385 (William A. Dembski ed., 1998) 
(Kaita earned a Ph.D. in physics from Rutgers University and now serves as a Principal 
Research Physicist in the Plasma Physics Laboratory at Princeton University); Alvin 
Plantinga, An Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism, in FAITH IN THEORY AND 
PRACTICE: ESSAYS ON JUSTIFYING RELIGIOUS BELIEF 35 (Carol White and Elizabeth 
Radcliffe eds. 1993) (Plantinga earned a Ph.D. in philosophy from Yale University and is 
now a John A. O’Brien Professor of Philosophy at University of Notre Dame); ALVIN 
PLANTINGA, WARRANT AND PROPER FUNCTION 216–37 (1993); DEL RATZSCH, NATURE, 
DESIGN AND SCIENCE: THE STATUS OF DESIGN IN NATURAL SCIENCE (2001) (Ratzsch 
earned a Ph.D. in philosophy from University of Massachusetts, Amherst and is 
currently a Professor of Philosophy at Calvin College). 
 48. The Court’s historical problem with the creationism curriculum required in the 
statute struck down in Edwards was its transparent connection to the Book of Genesis 
and the contents of previously repudiated statutes in Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 
109 (1968), and McLean v. Arkansas Board of Education, 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1272 
(1982).  In Epperson, the Court struck down on Establishment Clause grounds an 
Arkansas statute that forbade the teaching of evolution in public schools, because the 
FINALBECKWITH.DOC 2/3/2020  2:49 PM 
 
1320 
particular religion’s interpretation of its special revelation.  Rather, they 
are the result of empirical facts, well-grounded conceptual notions, and 
critical reflection.  They subsequently serve as the basis from which one 
may infer that an intelligent agent is likely responsible for the existence 
of certain apparently natural phenomena.  That is, evolution provides an 
answer to the very same question that this alternative is said to provide 
an answer: What is the origin of apparent design in biological organisms 
or other aspects of the natural universe or the universe as a whole?  
Evolution answers the question by appealing exclusively to the forces of 
unguided matter—or energy,49 the latter includes intelligent agency as a 
 
prohibition was based on evolution’s inconsistency with the Genesis account of origins, 
a religious point of view.  Epperson, 393 U.S. at 103.  In McLean, the federal district 
court struck down on Establishment Clause grounds an Arkansas statute that required 
public schools to offer balanced treatment of evolution and creationism, because the 
definition of “creationism” is transparently identical to the Genesis-account of origins, a 
religious point of view.  McLean, 529 F. Supp at 1259–64.  The Edwards court declared 
as unconstitutional, on Establishment Clause grounds, a Louisiana statute (the Balanced 
Treatment Act) that required the state’s public schools to teach creationism if evolution 
was taught and to teach evolution if creationism was taught.  Edwards, 482 U.S. at 589.  
It concluded that the true purpose of the Act was to advance a particular religious 
viewpoint, the Genesis account of creation.  Id. at 593.  Like the courts in Epperson and 
McLean, the Edwards court looked at the “historic and contemporaneous link between 
the teachings of certain religious denominations and the teaching of evolution.”  Id. at 
590.  Therefore, the courts in Edwards, Epperson, and McLean were asking the question: 
How closely does the curricular content required by the statute parallel the creation story 
in Genesis, or is the curricular content prohibited by the statute proscribed because it is 
inconsistent with the creation story in Genesis?  Consequently, public school science 
teachers that voluntarily add an alternative theory to, or criticism of, evolution to the 
prescribed curriculum do not violate the Establishment Clause if they do not violate any 
other legal duties and if their lessons do not appeal, either explicitly or implicitly, to the 
authority of the Book of Genesis (or any other religious text), which was the basis for the 
courts’ repudiation of creationism in the cases listed above. 
 49. Evolution, as understood in the literature, is a grand materialist explanation for 
the diversity and apparent design of entities that make up what we call nature, including 
both organic and inorganic entities.  In the words of Douglas Futuyama, “order in nature 
is no evidence of design.”  DOUGLAS J. FUTUYMA, SCIENCE ON TRIAL: THE CASE FOR 
EVOLUTION 114 (1995).  “Darwin’s great contribution,” wrote philosopher James 
Rachels, “was the final demolition of the idea that nature is the product of intelligent 
design.”  JAMES RACHELS, CREATED FROM ANIMALS: THE MORAL IMPLICATIONS OF 
DARWINISM 110 (1990).  However, Jay Wexler disagrees with this analysis.  He asserts 
that “evolution in pure form addresses only the question of how living creatures change 
over time.  It does not address the question of origins nor does it postulate the meaning 
of life.  It deals only with proximate causes, not ultimate ones.”  Jay D. Wexler, Note, Of 
Pandas, People, and the First Amendment: The Constitutionality of Teaching Intelligent 
Design in the Public Schools, 49 STAN. L. REV. 439, 462 n.212 (1997) (citations 
omitted).  As I have noted elsewhere, Wexler is simply mistaken.  See FRANCIS J. 
BECKWITH, LAW, DARWINISM AND PUBLIC EDUCATION: THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AND 
THE CHALLENGE OF INTELLIGENT DESIGN (forthcoming 2003) (manuscript at chapter 4, 
on file with author).  If all that is meant by evolution is that biological species adapt over 
time to changing environments and pass on those adaptations genetically to their 
offspring, even most creationists would not disagree with that modest definition of 
evolution.  But that is not what many citizens find objectionable about evolution, and it 
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legitimate cause that may account for some apparently natural 
phenomena.  The Supreme Court maintained that its holding in Edwards 
v. Aguillard50 did “not imply that a legislature could never require that 
scientific critiques of prevailing scientific theories be taught.”51  The 
Court asserted that “teaching a variety of scientific theories about the 
origins of humankind to schoolchildren might be validly done with the 
clear secular intent of enhancing the effectiveness of science 
instruction.”52  Granted, the conclusions inferred by the premises of 
these arguments may be consistent with and lend support to a tenet or 
tenets of a particular belief system, but that in itself would not make it 
constitutionally suspect.  As Justice Powell wrote in his Edwards 
concurrence, “A decision respecting the subject matter to be taught in 
public schools does not violate the Establishment Clause simply because 
the material to be taught ‘happens to coincide or harmonize with the 
tenets of some or all religions.’”53  If LeVake had offered to his students 
an alternative point of view, such as the one just suggested, and if his 
employer had then prohibited him from engaging in such speech during 
class time, he surely would have had a case with law in his favor. 
Given these different set of facts, the other public employee free 
speech cases on which the court relied either support or do not address 
the point of principle that grounds LeVake’s free speech rights as a 
particular type of public employee, a high school teacher.  Finch v. 
Wemlinger54 did not deal with a teacher’s classroom instruction, but with 
“an unclassified employee in the Governor’s Manpower Office (GMO),” 
and his firing after he publicly criticized his superiors.55  Similarly, 
Terrell v. University of Texas System Police56 dealt with “a public 
 
is not what is actually defended by proponents of evolutionary theory.  What these 
citizens find objectionable, and what is actually affirmed in the literature, is the 
methodological naturalism that evolution presupposes (that is, only nonagent, naturalistic 
explanations may count as “scientific knowledge”) and the ontological materialism it 
entails (that is, because all that exists, or all that we can know, is the material world, one 
is never warranted in affirming that a nonmaterial agent is the cause of a natural 
phenomenon). 
 50. 482 U.S. at 578. 
 51. Id. at 593. 
 52. Id. at 594. 
 53. Id. at 605 (Powell, J., concurring) (quoting Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 319 
(1980)). 
 54. Finch v. Wemlinger, 361 N.W.2d 865 (Minn. 1985), cited in LeVake, 625 
N.W.2d at 508. 
 55. Id. at 866. 
 56. Terrell v. Univ. of Texas Sys. Police, 792 F.2d 1360 (5th Cir. 1986),  cited in 
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employee” of the university police system, who “was fired when his 
secret diary, which was critical of his supervisor, fell into the 
supervisor’s hands.”57  The case of Mount Healthy City School District 
Board of Education v. Doyle58 dealt with a nontenured teacher with a 
history of troublemaking and public altercations who was not rehired 
after an incident involving his releasing to a local radio station a memo 
from his principal having to do with the appearance and dress of 
teachers.59  The case did not address what is germane to LeVake—the 
extent of a teacher’s academic freedom in the classroom.  Although in 
Mount Healthy the Supreme Court accepted “the District Court’s finding 
that the [teacher’s] communication was protected by the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments,” it is “not . . . entirely in agreement with that 
court’s manner of reasoning from this finding to the conclusion that 
Doyle is entitled to reinstatement with backpay.”60  Relying on the 
Pickering balancing test,61 the Court vacated and remanded the case 
back to the district court telling it that it “should have gone on to 
determine whether the Board had shown by a preponderance of the 
evidence that it would have reached the same decision as to respondent’s 
reemployment even in the absence of the protected conduct.”62 
The LeVake court cited Keyishian v. Board of Regents,63 involving 
two faculty members and one librarian who were dismissed by their 
employer, the State University of New York, for not signing state-
mandated loyalty oaths.64  The faculty members refused to sign a 
certificate indicating that they were not Communists and the librarian 
refused to sign a document indicating that he was not a member of a 
subversive organization that sought or advocated the forceful and violent 
overthrow of the U.S. government.65  Ironically, given the different set 
of facts proposed in this Essay, the Court’s decision in Keyishian would 
tend to support rather than undermine LeVake’s academic freedom to 
teach criticisms of evolution.  In Keyishian, the Court held that the New 
York statutes on which the firings were based were “invalid insofar as 
they proscribe mere knowing membership without any showing of 
 
LeVake, 625 N.W.2d at 508. 
 57. Id. at 1361. 
 58. Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977), 
cited in LeVake, 625 N.W.2d at 508. 
 59. Id. at 281–82. 
 60. Id. at 284. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 287. 
 63. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967), cited in LeVake, 625 
N.W.2d at 508. 
 64. Id. at 592. 
 65. Id. 
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specific intent to further the unlawful aims of the Communist Party of 
the United States or of the State of New York.”66  Thus, the mere fact 
that LeVake believes that evolutionary theory is false, or may belong to 
an organization or group that intends to circumvent the law in order to 
further this belief,67 does not show any specific intent on LeVake’s part 
to teach religion (creation science) or to teach the curriculum incorrectly, 
both of which would be unlawful.  In addition, the Keyishian holding is 
replete with assertions about the value of academic freedom and that the 
classroom ought to be a free “marketplace of ideas.”68  For example, the 
Court wrote: 
Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of 
transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned.  That 
freedom is therefore a special concern of the First Amendment, which does not 
tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom. ‘The vigilant 
protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the 
community of American schools.’69 
Clearly the LeVake court was correct that academic freedom in public 
schools is not absolute and must be balanced by other state interests—
Clark, Pickering, Webster, and Mount Healthy unambiguously affirm 
this.  However, if LeVake would have taught the curriculum adequately 
and included relevant materials critical of evolution, as in the fictional 
 
 66. Id. at 609–10. 
 67. The curriculum director’s request that LeVake answer questions about his 
religious beliefs so that she may infer whether LeVake would unlawfully teach the 
prescribed curriculum seems analogous to trying to find out if a faculty member is a 
Communist and inferring from it that the faculty member intends to engage in an 
unlawful overthrow of the government.  One account of LeVake’s case published in a 
conservative Christian magazine, reads: 
  LeVake was even more amazed when the curriculum director asked him 
whether he ever mentioned God or the Bible in his science class.  He said no. 
  Then she asked whether his students knew he was a Christian. 
  “That was one that I couldn’t answer right away.  I would like to have 
said, ‘Yes, they do know, just because of the way I act.’  But I didn’t want to 
say it that way because she would probably think that I was proselytizing in 
my classroom.  So I said, ‘I would hope so because I don’t curse, and I don’t 
do things that would make people think I’m not a Christian.’” 
  Although he was surprised by the questions, LeVake said, “It gave me 
some light on where they were coming from.  Those questions betrayed what 
they were thinking.” 
Frank York, No Admittance, TEACHERS IN FOCUS 2000, http://www.family.org/cforum/ 
teachersmag/features/a0009437.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2002). 
 68. Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603. 
 69. Id. (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960)). 
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scenario above, he could have benefited from vast case law on his side.70 
First, the Court in Epperson acknowledged the academic freedom of 
teachers and students as grounded in their First Amendment right of 
freedom of expression: 
Our courts . . . have not failed to apply the First Amendment’s mandate in our 
educational system where essential to safeguard the fundamental values of 
freedom of speech and inquiry and of belief.  By and large, public education in 
our Nation is committed to the control of state and local authorities.  Courts do 
not and cannot intervene in the resolution of conflicts which arise in the daily 
operation of school systems and which do not directly and sharply implicate 
basic constitutional values. 
 . . . The Court . . . [has] acknowledged the State’s power to prescribe the 
school curriculum, but it held [in Meyer v. Nebraska71] that these were not 
adequate to support the restriction upon the liberty of teacher and pupil.72 
According to a district court in Moore v. Gaston County Board of 
Education,73 “[t]hat teachers are entitled to First Amendment freedoms 
is an issue no longer in dispute,”74 because “[a]lthough academic 
freedom is not one of the enumerated rights of the First Amendment, the 
Supreme Court has on numerous occasions emphasized that the right to 
teach, to inquire, to evaluate and to study is fundamental to a democratic 
society.”75  This is why, in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community 
School District,76 the Court wrote: 
First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of the 
school environment, are available to teachers and students.  It can hardly be 
argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom 
of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.  This has been the 
unmistakable holding of this Court for almost 50 years.77 
Second, the Edwards court assumed that teachers had the academic 
freedom to “supplant the present science curriculum with the 
 
 70. The depth of case law and legal analysis in this area is immense.  This Essay 
does not attempt to provide comprehensive coverage, but defers to and directs readers to 
the following excellent articles written by qualified experts: David K. DeWolf, Academic 
Freedom After Edwards, 13 REGENT U. L. REV. 448 (2000–01) [hereinafter DeWolf, 
Academic Freedom]; David K. DeWolf et al., Teaching the Origins Controversy: 
Science, or Religion, or Speech?, 2000 UTAH L. REV. 39, 98–110. 
 71. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402–03 (1923). 
 72. Epperson, 393 U.S. at 104–05.  See also William W. Van Alstyne, Academic 
Freedom and the First Amendment in the Supreme Court of the United States: An 
Unhurried Historical Review, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 79  (1990). 
 73. Moore v. Gaston County Bd. of Educ., 357 F. Supp. 1037 (W.D. N.C. 1973). 
 74. Id. at 1039.  The Moore court held that “[t]o discharge a teacher without 
warning because his answers to scientific and theological questions do not fit the notions 
of the local parents and teachers is a violation of the Establishment clause of the First 
Amendment.”  Id. at 1043. 
 75. Id. at 1039–40 (citation omitted). 
 76. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
 77. Id. at 506. 
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presentation of theories, besides evolution, about the origin of life”78 
without needing the Balanced Treatment Act, which was struck down by 
the Court on the grounds that the Act’s construction would lead to 
limiting rather than advancing the academic freedom of teachers to offer 
alternative views.79  The Webster court affirmed the principle that a 
“school may not flatly prohibit teachers from mentioning relevant 
material.”80  As DeWolf wrote, “The Supreme Court has been emphatic 
in noting that in public schools, the suppression of ideas based upon a 
disagreement with the ideas themselves is a violation of the First 
Amendment.”81 
III.  CONCLUSION 
In LeVake, the court correctly ruled against the plaintiff, but it should 
have done so not because of his belief in the falsity of evolution or 
because he sought to offer his students thoughtful nonsectarian 
criticisms of evolutionary theory, but rather, because of his past 
performance of teaching the class and his verbal admission that he could 
not teach the prescribed curriculum.  Discriminating against persons 
because of their religious belief is de facto—not merely prima facie—
unconstitutional.  Bringing into the classroom relevant material that 
supplements the curriculum (and does not violate any other legal duties), 
when public school teachers have adequately fulfilled all of their 








 78. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 587. 
 79. The court stated: 
[U]nder the Act’s requirements, teachers who were once free to teach any and  
all facets of this subject are now unable to do so.  Moreover, the Act fails even 
to ensure that creation science will be taught, but instead requires the teaching 
of this theory only when the theory of evolution is taught.   
Id. at 588–89. 
 80. Webster, 917 F.2d at 1008 (summarizing a principle enunciated in Zykan v. 
Warsaw Community School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300, 1305–06 (7th Cir. 1980)). 
 81. DeWolf, Academic Freedom, supra note 70, at 479 (citing Bd. of Educ. v. 
Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982)). 
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